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ANALYSIS AND UNDERSTANDING
OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT OF 1993
Jane Riglert
During the middle of an academic semester, a forty-three-year-
old law professor who resides and works in Pennsylvania learns
that her seventy-three-year-old mother has cancer. The mother is
retired, lives in California, and is scheduled to begin chemotherapy
in two days. The course of the chemotherapy is expected to cover
a six-month period with doses administered every other week. The
professor approaches her boss, the school's dean, and asks if she
might be granted a leave of absence, effective the next day, to stay
with her mother over the course of the chemotherapy. The law
school has never dealt with a similar request and has no
institutional policy covering the subject. How should the dean
respond?
Most states, including Pennsylvania, do not have
comprehensive state legislation dealing with an employer's
obligation to grant leaves of absence to accommodate employees'
familial needs and responsibilities. Thus, the dean's response in the
above-described scenario will be dictated primarily by the terms of
the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).' That
legislation, effective August 5, 1993,2 requires employers of nearly
fifty percent of the nation's workforce3 to provide leaves of
t Professor, The Dickinson School of Law; LL.M., New York University; J.D.,
Florida State University; B.A., University of Iowa.
1. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (awarding unpaid leave for
up to 12 weeks to attend to certain familial needs).
2. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 405(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). If an effective collective bargaining agreement existed between
the relevant employer and its employees on August 5, then the Act took effect on the
expiration of the contract or February 5, 1994, whichever occurred first. Id.
3. H.R. REP. No. 8, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 60 (1993). Others have
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
absence to employees when the leave sought is associated with the
birth of a child,4 the placement of a child for adoption or in foster
care,- the employee's ill-health,6  or the ill-health of the
employee's immediate family member.' Employers must continue
to provide health insurance coverage during the leave.' When the
employee returns the employer must restore the employee to her
original position or an equivalent one.9
The FMLA represents a fundamental change in the way
American employers are required to acknowledge and accommodate
employees and their families.' This Article examines the new
legislation and the accompanying interim final regulations
promulgated by the Department of Labor" and considers the
interplay between the FMLA and other pieces of federal and state
legislation dealing with workplace issues. The Article is designed
to provide a comprehensive understanding of FMLA rights and
obligations as well as to explore the Act's inconsistencies and
shortcomings. Particular emphasis is placed on issues likely to
require resolution through litigation or remedial congressional
action. After a brief look at the impetus for the legislation, the
Article focuses on four primary issues: (1) To whom does the Act
apply? (2) to what protections are employees entitled? (3) how are
those protections secured? and (4) how does the FMLA relate to
estimated that only 40 percent of the U.S. workforce is affected by the Act. DOL Plans
to Extend FMLA Comment Period, I Analysis/News and Background Info., 143 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 508, 509 (Aug. 16, 1993).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
6. Id. § 2612(a)(l)(D).
7. Id. § 2612(a)(l)(C).
8. Id. § 2614(c)(1); see also infra text accompanying notes 119-26.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 261(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also infra text
accompanying notes 163-74.
10. The General Accounting Office estimated that about 2.5 million people were likely
to take FMLA leave. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794,
31,810 (1993).
11. "As of Nov. 11, the Labor Department had not yet forwarded the final rules to the
Office of Management and Budget, where they could remain under review for up to 90
days." House Republicans Question Whether Uponcomg FMLA Regulations Are Tainted,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Item 10, (Nov. 16, 1994). It has been suggested by the
Republican members of the House Education and Labor Committee that "certain interest
groups [may] have had an opportunity to unfairly influence the final Family and Medical
Leave Act regulations." Id. The Republicans, in a November 14th letter to Secretary of
Labor Robert Reich, "expressed concern that Labor Department staff may have shared
advance copies of the draft regulations with a select number of interest groups and, after
negotiating with these groups, incorporated suggested changes in the final rules." Id.
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other relevant legislation? The Article does not provide an
exhaustive review of the interim regulations which supply detailed
guidance to many of the Act's nuances, but still uses the
regulations extensively. The Article focuses on issues of
consistency, fairness, and manageability as they relate to the Act's
mission and framework.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 was the first
piece of legislation signed by President Bill Clinton. 2 Although
virtually identical bills had been passed by the 101st and 102nd
Congresses, President George Bush vetoed them. 3 The Democratic
Congress was unable to muster the votes to override the vetoes.
The bills passed by the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses
were preceded by several years' consideration of family leave
issues. The Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, in
1984, conducted a comprehensive investigation of the issues and
"unariimously recommended that Congress review improving cur-
rent leave policies, including the issue of job continuity." 4 Repre-
sentative Patricia Schroeder then introduced H.R. 2020, the Parent
and Disability Leave Act of 1985, on April 4, 1985."5 Representa-
tive Schroeder's bill provided unpaid leave to employees upon the
birth or adoption of a child or to care for a seriously ill child, as
well as unpaid leave necessitated by an employee's own serious
health condition. 6 Other, similar pieces of legislation were offered
in subsequent years with various committees holding hearings and
issuing reports."
Motivation for the legislation was summarized by the Senate
Report which accompanied the 1993 Act. It asserted that "[t]he
United States has experienced a demographic revolution in the
composition of the workforce, with profound consequences for the
lives of working men and women and their families."'" A particu-
12. Doing the Leave Policy Shuffle, U.S. NEWS & XWVORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at 21.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 3, at 20-21 (tracing the history of this legisla-
tion).
14. Id. at 18.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18-21.
18. S. REP. No. 3, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4591995]
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lar focus was the dramatic change over the last forty years in the
number of women in the workforce and the substantial increase in
the number of single-parent households. The report noted a more
than two-hundred percent increase in the female civilian labor force
since 1950."9 It stated: "The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts
that by the year 2005, the female labor force participation rate will
reach 66.1 percent."2 While in 1900 the percentage of women in
the labor force was nineteen, "today 74 percent of women aged 25-
54 are in the labor force.",2' The Senate Report highlighted Census
Bureau reports that "single parents accounted for 27 percent of all
family groups with children under 18 years old in 1988, more than
twice the 1970 proportion." 22 It asserted that "[d]ivorce, separa-
tion, and out-of-wedlock births have left millions of women to
struggle as single heads of households to support themselves and
their children."23
Also of congressional concern was "another dramatic demo-
graphic shift: the aging of the American population. '24 The Senate
Report relied on a National Council of Aging estimate that "20 to
25 percent of the more than 100 million American workers have
some caregiving responsibility for an older relative."'
The Report characterized these demographic changes as "far
reaching,'26 and went on to assert:
With men and women alike as wage earners, the crucial
unpaid caretaking services traditionally performed by
wives--care of young children, ill family members, aging
parents-has [sic] become increasingly difficult for families
to fulfill. When there is no one to provide such care, indi-
viduals can be permanently scarred as basic needs go un-
fulfilled. Families unable to perform their essential function
are seriously undermined and weakened. Finally, when
families fail, the community is left to grapple with the
tragic consequences of emotionally and physically deprived
19. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7-8.
20. Id., reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
21. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
22. Id.
23. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9.
26. Id.
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children and adults.27
The Senate Report also commented on the United States' inter-
national reputation regarding family leave issues, observing:
The United States is one of the few remaining coun-
tries in the world that has not enacted a law setting a
standard for family leave. With the exception of the United
States, virtually every industrialized country, as well as
many Third World countries, have national policies 'that
require employers to provide some form of maternity or
parental leave. 8
The Report also noted that "[t]he United States' major competitors
provide some form of paid leave."'29
The formula chosen by Congress to recognize these changes in
the American workforce was characterized by the Senate Report as
"a minimum labor standard for leave."3 "The [legislation] is
based on the same principle as the child labor laws, the minimum
wage, Social Security, the safety and health laws, the pension and
welfare benefit laws, and other labor laws that establish minimum
standards for employment."31 These types of legislation establish a
floor, a minimum, that a covered employer must provide employ-
ees. Employers are free to enact policies and programs more gener-
ous than the federal minimum and states may establish require-
ments more beneficial than those imposed by the federal FMLA.
II. COVERAGE
By excluding most federal employees,32 Title I of the FMLA
covers employees of private employers and state and local govern-
27. Id.
28. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 19, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
31. Id.
32. Title I excludes "any Federal officer or employee covered under subehapter V of
chapter 63 of Title 5"' 29 U.S.C. § 2611(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Instead, these per-
sons, commonly referred to as federal civil service employees, are covered under Title II
of the FMLA. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 7,
19 (1993). Moreover, employees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives are
covered by Title V of the FLMA. 2 U.S.C. § 60m (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Nevertheless,
some federal employees are still covered under Title I. See The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.109 (1993) (listing various federal employees cov-
ered under Title I).
1995]
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ments. The focus of this article is on Title I. Title I of the FMLA
requires "employers," as defined by the Act,33 to provide certain
benefits to "eligible employees. 34 The Act defines "employer" as
"any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each
working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the
current or preceding calendar year."35 The term "employer" also
"includes any 'public agency' as defined in section 3(x) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)"36 Under the FLSA, and
accordingly under the FMLA, "[a] 'public agency' . . . [includes]
the government of a State or political subdivision thereof, a State,
or a political subdivision of a State."37
In the definition of "employer," use of the phrase "engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce"38
refers to interstate commerce.39 The interim regulations specify
that employers who meet the fifty employee test are thereby
deemed to engage in commerce or to affect commerce.' Employ-
er coverage, then, should generally be a simple matter of counting
employees, and if the employer has fifty or more employees, the
employer is covered, subject only to the twenty calendar workweek
requirement.4 The twenty workweeks, however, need not be con-
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining "employer").
34. Id. § 2611(2)(A) (defining "eligible employee").
35. Id. § 2611(4)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The interim regulations provide that
whether an employer satisfies the 50-employee requirement "is determined when the em-
ployee requests the leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(d) (1993). A subsequent or expected
decline in employees does not affect eligibility. Id.
[O]nce an employee is determined eligible . . . eligibility is not affected by
any subsequent change in the number of employees . . . .Similarly, an em-
ployer may not terminate employee leave that has already started if the employ-
ee-count drops below 50. For example, if an employer employs 60 employees
in August, but expects that the number of employees will drop to 40 in De-
cember, the employer must grant FMLA benefits to an employee who requests
leave in August for a period of leave to begin in December.
Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
37. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 3(x), 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (1988). Note that no
minimum number of employees is required for "public agency" coverage while private
employers must employ 50 employees to meet the "employer" definition. But see infra
text accompanying note 49.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(b) (1993).
40. Id.
41. The interim regulations use a payroll method for determining the number of em-
ployees employed by an employer during a particular time period. Id. § 825.105(a).
[Vol. 45:457
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41
secutive.
Obviously, some employers that have over fifty employees one
year may have less than fifty employees in a future year. Having
less than fifty employees for one year, however, does not eliminate
the employer's FMLA obligation. Rather, the employer must em-
ploy fewer than fifty employees for two consecutive years to avoid
FMLA liability.
43
It is, however, entirely possible for a covered "employer" not
to employ any "eligible employees" entitled to FMLA benefits. The
FMLA defines "employee" by reference to subsections (e) and (g)
of section 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 44 The Fair
Labor Standards Act provides that an employee is "any individual
employed by an employer"4 and provides that "'[employ]' in-
cludes to suffer or permit to work."46
Nevertheless, simply working for an employer who employs
more than fifty employees does not guarantee the employee leave
since the Act's entitlements flow only to an "eligible employee."47
An "eligible employee" is a person who has "been employed-[(l)]
for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave
is requested ... ; and [(2)] for at least 1,250 hours of service with
such employer during the previous 12-month period. '4' Thus, a
"Any employee whose name appears on the employer's payroll will be considered em-
ployed each working day of the calendar week, and must be counted whether or not any
compensation is received for the week." Id.
42. Id. § 825.105(d).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating an employer is
covered if it employs 50 or more employees "in the current or preceding calendar year").
44. See id. § 2611(3) (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) & (g) (1988)).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1988).
46. Id. § 203(g).
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (giving the "eligible employ-
ee" right to leave); id. § 2614(a) (giving an "eligible employee" who takes a leave the
right to have her position restored).
48. Id. § 2611(2). According to the regulations, the 1250 minimum hours of service is
determined according to the principles established under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) for determining compensable hours of work (see 29 CFR
part 785). The determining factor is the number of hours an employee has
worked for the employer within the meaning of the FLSA. The determination is
not limited by methods of recordkeeping, or by compensation agreements that
do not accurately reflect all of the hours an employee has worked for or been
in service to the employer. Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked
under FLSA's principles may be used; in the absence of actual records of
hours worked, employees who are exempt from FLSA's requirement that a
record be kept of their hours worked (e.g., bona fide executive, administrative,
and professional employees as defined in FLSA Regulations, 29 CFR Part 541)
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
business with fifty employees which has just opened its doors or
which employs only part-time employees who work less than 1250
hours a year, will not have employees entitled to FMLA benefits.
The statute excludes from the definition of "eligible employee"
any employee employed "at a worksite at which such employer
employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees
employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less
than 50."4' Under this exclusion, employees of small "public
agencies," such as small villages or townships, which meet the
definition of "employer" but do not have fifty employees are not
entitled to benefits under the Act. Also excluded is an employee of
a covered private employer if fewer than fifty employees work at
her worksite and combining employees at worksites within seventy-
five miles of each other does not total fifty.
Certain "key employees,"5 although they satisfy the "eligible
employee" criteria, are limited in their FMLA protections. These
"key employees" are entitled to leave and a continuation of their
health benefits during that leave, but under limited circumstances
the employer may refuse to reinstate them to their prior posi-
tions." The employee who may be denied restoration is defined
as a "salaried eligible employee who is among the highest paid 10
percent of the employees employed by the employer within 75
miles of the facility at which the employee is employed."5 Denial
and who have worked for the employer for at least 12 months will be pre-
sumed to have worked at least 1,250 hours during the previous 12 months. See
§ 825.500(d). For this purpose, full-time teachers (see § 825.800 for definition)
of an elementary or secondary school system, or institution of higher education,
or other educational establishment or institution are deemed to meet the 1,250
hour test.
Id. § 825.110(c) (1993). The 12 months "need not be consecutive months." L.
§ 825.110(b). "The determinations of whether an employee has worked for the employer
for at least 1,250 hours . . . and been employed ... for a total of at least 12 months
must be made as of the date leave commences." Id. § 825.110(d).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The 75-mile radius is mea-
sured by road miles, using surface transportation over public streets, roads, highways and
waterways, by the shortest route from the facility where the eligible employee requesting
leave is employed." 29 C.F.R. 825.111(b) (1993). The term worksite is also addressed in
the interim regulations. See id. § 825.111(a).
50. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(a) (1993) (defining key employee). The term "key em-
ployee" is nothing more than the regulation's method of referring to the employee de-
scribed in subsection (b)(2) of section 2614 of the Act. See infra note 52 and accompa-
nying text.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Since "key employees" are not
guaranteed their former positions when ready to return to work, it may be inaccurate even
to characterize their absence from work as "leave."
, 52. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The "highest paid 10 percent" in-
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of restoration is permitted, however, only if it is "necessary to
prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the operations
of the employer." 3 The employer must notify the "key employee"
of the intent to deny restoration at the time the employer deter-
mines that such injury would occur.'
cludes all employees, whether eligible or ineligible, salaried and non-salaried. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.217(c) (1993). Earnings include wages, premium pay, incentive pay, and bonuses.
Id. § 825.217(c)(1). Although § 2614(b) is titled "exception concerning certain highly
compensated employees," 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614(b) (vest Supp. 1993), an employee need
not be particularly well paid to meet the § 2614(b)(2) definition. If the employer compen-
sated the bulk of its workforce on an hourly basis and paid them the federal minimum
wage, $4.25 per hour, and a salaried supervisor receives $300 a week, she may very well
be a § 2614(b) "highly compensated employee."
53. Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
An employer who believes that reinstatement may be denied to a key employ-
ee, must give written notice to the employee at the time FMLA leave is re-
quested (or when FMLA leave commences, if earlier) that he or she qualifies
as a key employee. At the same time, the employer must also fully inform the
employee of the potential consequences with respect to reinstatement and main-
tenance of health benefits if the employer should determine that substantial and
grievous economic injury to the employer's operations will result if the employ-
ee is reinstated from FMLA leave. If such notice cannot be given immediately
because of the need to determine whether the employee is a key employee, it
shall be given as soon as practicable after receipt of a request for leave (or the
commencement of leave, if earlier) . . . . [A]n employer who fails to provide
such timely notice will lose its right to deny restoration even if substantial and
grievous economic injury will result from reinstatement.
29 C.F.R. § 825.219(a) (1993).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.219(b)-(d) (1993) (detailing employer's notice requirements). These regulations pro-
vide:
(b) As soon as an employer makes a good faith determination, based
on the facts available, that substantial and grievous economic injury to its oper-
ations will result if a key employee who has requested or is using FMLA
leave is reinstated, the employer shall notify the employee in writing of its
determination, that it cannot deny FMLA leave, and that it intends to deny
restoration to employment on completion of the FMLA leave. It is anticipated
that an employer will ordinarily be able to give such notice prior to the em-
ployee starting leave. The employer must serve this notice either in person or
by certified mail. This notice must explain the basis for the employer's finding
that substantial and grievous economic injury will result, and must provide the
employee a reasonable time in which to return to work, taking into account the
circumstances, such as the length of the leave and the urgency of the need fpr
the employee to return.
(c) If an employee does not return to work in response to the
employer's notification of intent to deny restoration, the employee continues to
be entitled to maintenance of health benefits and the employer may not recover
its cost of health benefit premiums. A key employee's rights under FMLA
continue unless and until the employee either gives notice that he or she no
longer wishes to return to work, or the employer actually denies reinstatement
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The Act clearly specifies that it must be the restoration which
will cause "substantial and grievous" injury," not the employee's
absence. While it may be reasonable to conclude that certain indi-
viduals are so critical to an employer's success that their absence
is intolerable, the FMLA "key employee" exception does not ad-
dress such an individual. The Act provides no relief for an em-
ployer of that valuable an employee. The interim regulations speci-
fy that, in determining "substantial and grievous injury," the em-
ployer
[m]ay take into account its ability to replace on a tempo-
rary basis (or temporarily do without) the employee on
FMLA leave. If permanent replacement is unavoidable, the
cost of then reinstating the employee can be considered in
evaluating whether substantial and grievous economic injury
will occur from restoration; in other words, the effect on
the operations of the company of reinstating the employee
in an equivalent position. 6
While the "economic viability" of the firm need not be threatened
in order to deny restoration, 7 the regulations nonetheless focus on
whether it would be too costly for an employer that has perma-
at the conclusion of the leave period.
(d) After notice to an employee has been given that substantial and
grievous economic injury will result if the employee is reinstated to employ-
ment, an employee is still entitled to request reinstatement at the end of the
leave period even if the employee did not return to work in response to the
employer's notice. The employer must then determine whether there will be
substantial and grievous economic injury from reinstatement, based on the facts
at that time. If it is determined that substantial and grievous economic injury
will result, the employer shall notify the employee in writing (in person or by
certified mail) of the denial of restoration.
Id.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The plain meaning of the
statutory language is that it must be the restoration to employment, rather than the taking
of the leave, which would cause the injury. The legislative history on this point, however,
is somewhat confused." The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg.
31,794, 31,805 (1993).
The interim regulations are also somewhat confused. These regulations state that the
employer "must provide the employee a reasonable time in which to return to work,
taking into account the circumstances, such as the length of the leave and the urgency of
the need for the employee to return." 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(b) (1993) (emphasis added).
These factors suggest that it is the employee's leave, not the restoration, which is causing
the injury.
56. 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(b) (1993).
57. Id. § 825.218(c).
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nently replaced the on-leave employee to maintain both employees
on the payroll.
The key employee exception poses many difficulties. Arbitrarily
using the top ten percent of salaried workforce can lead to trou-
bling results. Insignificant differences in pay might cause signifi-
cant differences in FMLA protections. An employee earning
$65,000 annually may be in the top ten percent, while her col-
league earning $64,950 may not. Changes in the employer's payroll
might cause an individual to be in the top ten percent one year,
but not the next. Finally, differences in how employees are com-
pensated, such as salary versus commission, might affect coverage
since the exclusion refers only to salaried employees. What about a
highly compensated individual who receives no salary but a whop-
ping income in commissions?5 The Act's literal language pre-
cludes any assertion that such an employee may be denied the full
range of FMLA benefits.
The notion that restoration to employment will cause "substan-
tial and grievous economic injury" will also lead to disquieting
outcomes. A highly paid employee's restoration in one year might
cause no such injury; in a subsequent year, the same employee
might be denied restoration if leave was taken, the employer re-
placed her and restoration would cause "substantial and grievous
economic injury" to the employer. In addition, two employees
holding identical positions taking FMLA leave at the same time
could have different levels of job security. The employer might
seek replacements for both employees but be able to put only one
replacement on the payroll by the time both leaves end. Restoring
one employee plus continuing the employment of the replacement
might not lead to "substantial and grievous economic injury," but
restoring two employees and maintaining the replacement might.
58. Family Leave Law Could Spark Litigation, 1 Analysis/News and Background Info.,
143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 496, 497 (Aug. 16, 1993) (questioning whether a highly com-
missioned employee should be considered a "key employee"). The interim regulations
provide that "[t]he t rm 'salaried' means 'paid on a salary basis,' as defined in 29 C.F.R.
541.118." 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(b) (1993). 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1993) states:
[Ain employee will be considered to be paid "on a salary basis" within the
meaning of the regulations if under his employment agreement he regularly
receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined
amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not sub-
ject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of work per-
formed.
4671995]
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Surely there is no fairness in permitting the employer to deny
restoration to one of these two employees.
Under this Act, any sort of advanced planning by highly com-
pensated employees to have a child or to care for an elderly parent
will be almost impossible. How do such employees know whether
they fall within the top ten percent of payroll? Should the employ-
ee broach these very personal matters of pregnancy and parental
care with the employer in order to determine whether the employer
would try to replace her? Should the employee seek information
about the employer's financial condition to make an independent
judgment about whether having a replacement as well as the em-
ployee on the payroll would cause "substantial and grievous eco-
nomic injury?"
It is difficult to predict what effect the potential denial of
restoration for the highly compensated employee will have on all
interested parties. The employer might assume that any benefit
gained by permanently replacing a temporarily absent employee
will be outweighed by the litigation risks associated with the
employers obligation to establish "substantial and grievous injury"
to justify the replacement. 9 Thus, employers may be reluctant to
deny restoration to any employee. On the other hand, the mere
potential for job loss might so discourage highly compensated
employees that they might forgo their FMLA entitlement, never
presenting the issue of whether their restoration would result in
"substantial and grievous economic injury."'
The "key employee" exception does not ensure that an employ-
er can insist upon continuous service by an indispensable employ-
59. Neither the statute nor the interim regulations explicitly provide that the burden is
on the employer to demonstrate that restoration would cause substantial and grievous
economic injury; however, the interim regulations suggest such an approach. See 29
C.F.R. § 825.219(b) (noting that employer "must explain the basis for the employer's
finding that substantial and grievous economic injury will result"). An employer may very
well argue that the burden is on the employee to establish that restoration would not
cause substantial and grievous economic injury. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (discussing the burdens of persuasion in employment discrimination litigation).
In response to an inquiry regarding the reinstatement rights of a non-"key employee," the
Department of Labor has opined that "[a]n employer has the burden of proving that an
employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time the employee returning
from FMLA leave seeks reinstatement." U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Op., 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) § 5407 (New Developments, Oct. 15, 1993) (emphasis added).
60. The failure of highly compensated individuals to avail themselves of FMLA leave
might also mean that fewer rank-and-file employees will use the FMLA's protections.
Those employees may see the supervisor's reluctance to take FMLA leave as a subtle
message that they should behave similarly.
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ee. Telling evidence that the enacted exception for "key employ-
ees" is not a necessary aspect of a workable system of personnel
management is the complete absence of such an exception in Title
II of the FMLA, the section dealing with federal civil service em-
ployees. It is only the private and state and local government sec-
tors which will have to struggle with the "key employee" excep-
tion.
H. To WHAT PROTECTIONS ARE ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES
ENTITLED?
A. General Provisions
The essence of the FMLA is the concept of job security: em-
ployees may attend to familial responsibilities confident that their
employment is secure. In terms of employment benefits and
protections, an employee on FMLA authorized leave must be treat-
ed at least as well as any other employee whose temporary absence
is excused and, with regard to certain benefits, maybe better.
During each twelve-month period6 "an eligible employee [is]
61. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The employer is permitted to
select one of four methods "for determining the '12-month period' in which the 12 weeks
of leave entitlement occurs." 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(b) (1993). The methods are:
(1) The calendar year;
(2) Any fixed 12-month "leave year," such as a fiscal year, a year
required by State law, or a year starting on an employee's "anniversary" date;
(3) The 12-month period measured forward from the date any
employee's first FMLA leave begins; or
(4) A "rolling" 12-month period measured backward from the date an
employee uses any FMLA leave (except that such measure may not extend
back before August 5, 1993).
Id. § 825.200(b)(I)-(4). Under the calendar year or fixed leave year methods,
an employee would be entitled to up to 12 weeks of FMLA leave at any time
in the fixed 12-month period selected. An employee could, therefore, take 12
weeks of leave at the end of the year and 12 weeks at the beginning of the
following year. Under the method in [which the leave is measured forward
from the date any employee's first FMLA leave begins,] an employee would be
entitled to 12 weeks of leave during the year beginning on the first date
FMLA leave is taken; the next 12-month period would begin the first time
FMLA leave is taken after completion of any previous 12-month period. Under
the . . . "rolling" 12-month period, each time an employee takes FMLA leave
the remaining leave entitlement would be any balance of the 12 weeks which
has not been used during the immediately preceding 12 months. For example,
if an employee has taken eight weeks of leave during the past 12 months, an
additional four weeks of leave could be taken. If an employee used four weeks
beginning February 1, 1994, four weeks beginning June 1, 1994, and four
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entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave . . . for one or more
of the following:"62 (1) because of the birth of a child of the em-
ployee and in order to care for such child63 (2) because of the
placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster
care' (3) in order to care for the employee's spouse, son, daugh-
ter, or parent if such spouse, son, daughter or parent has a serious
health condition65 or (4) because of a serious health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform her employment func-
tions.'
If a husband and wife are employed by the same employer, the
aggregate number of weeks of leave to which both may be entitled
is limited. During any twelve-month period, if the leave is taken
because of the birth or placement of a child or to care for a sick
parent, the couple is entitled to no more than twelve weeks.67 The
Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor that ac-
weeks beginning December 1, 1994, the employee would not be entitled to any
additional leave until February 1, 1995. However, on February 1, 1995, the
employee would be entitled to four weeks of leave, on June 1 the employee
would be entitled to an additional four weeks, etc.
* * .Employers will be allowed to choose any one of the alterna-
tives ... provided the alternative chosen is applied consistently and uniformly
to all employees. An employer wishing to change to another alternative is
required to give at least 60 days notice to all employees, and the transition
must take place in such a way that the employees retain the full benefit of 12
weeks of leave under whichever method affords the greatest benefit to the
employee. Under no circumstances may a new method be implemented in order
to avoid the Act's leave requirements.
Id. § 825.200(c)-(d).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
63. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A).
64. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
65. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
66. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(f)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "This limitation in the total
weeks of leave applies as long as a husband and wife are employed by the 'same em-
ployer.' It would apply, for example, even though the spouses are employed at two differ-
ent worksites of an employer located more than 75 miles from each other . 29
C.F.R. § 825.202(b) (1993). The interim regulations also provide:
Where the husband and wife both use a portion of the total 12-week FMLA
leave entitlement for [birth or placement of a child or to care for a parent], the
husband and wife would each be entitled to the difference between the amount
he or she has taken individually and 12 weeks for FMLA leave for a purpose
other than [birth or placement of a child or to care for a parent]. For example,
if each spouse took 6 weeks of leave for the birth of a child, each could later
use an additional 6 weeks due to a personal illness or to care of a sick child.
Id. § 825.202(c).
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companied the bill asserted that this provision was included so that
employers would not be discouraged from hiring husbands and
wives.' The statute, however, will hardly encourage employers
who are predisposed against hiring such couples. As stated, the
twelve-week couple maximum is limited to leaves associated with
birth or placement of a child or care for a sick parent.' The Act,
however, provides no spousal limitation on leaves to care for a
non-newborn child or to care for each other. Thus, a couple with
an ill eight-year-old child would each be entitled to twelve weeks
of leave. Such leave could be taken simultaneously by the parents
or separately, at different times during the year. Imagine further
that a husband and wife are employed by the same employer and
the wife undergoes a Caesarean delivery. If the Caesarean delivery
was medically necessary, the wife would be entitled to up to
twelve weeks leave associated with her "serious health condition."
Simultaneously, the husband could take up to twelve weeks of
FMLA leave because of the childbirth or the need to care for his
spouse.
The restriction on leave for couples for childbirth or placement
can also lead to unfair results. If a man and woman, unmarried but
employed by the same employer, have a child together, each would
be entitled to twelve weeks of leave since the statute imposes a
limitation only on a "husband and wife."7
The limitation on a couple to twelve weeks of leave to care for
a parent is unnecessary. "Parent" does not include a parent-in-
law7' and, therefore, the limitation would apply only in those ex-
traordinary circumstances where a husband and wife have a com-
mon parent.72
The terms "spouse," "son," "daughter," and "parent" are de-
fined by the Act. In addition to biological parents, the term "par-
ent" includes "an individual who stood in loco parentis to an em-
ployee when the employee was a son or daughter."73 Obviously,
the use of the expression "in loco parentis" encompasses a broad
68. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 3, at 38.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. See Family Leave Law, supra note 58, at 497 (noting spousal restriction could be
a point of litigation).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(b) (1993).
72. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,801
(1993) ("IT]he circumstances in which such [parental leave] limitation might actually apply
are extremely unlikely.").
73. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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group. Grandparents, aunts, uncles, siblings and even non-relatives
may fit the interim regulation's description of "those with day-to-
day responsibilities to care for and financially support a child"'74
or one "who had such responsibility when the employee was a
child. '75 The expansive definition obviously contemplates that for
FMLA purposes an individual may have more than two "par-
ents. 76
The term "spouse" means a husband or wife77 and includes
common law marriage partners. 78  "Son" and "daughter" are de-
fined as "biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal
ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is -
[(1)] under eighteen years of age, or [(2)] 18 years of age or older
and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disabili-
ty."79 The interim regulations specify that the disability for those
eighteen and above must be such that the "individual requires
active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in several
of the 'activities of daily living."' 8 Accordingly, for an employee
to be eligible for family leave to take care of a child over eighteen
years old, the child must have not only a "serious health condi-
tion" but must also be incapable of self care.
In contrast, no similar limitation regarding incapacity for self-
74. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(3) (1993).
75. Id.
76. Compare the expansive approach to the concept of parenthood with the niggardly
approach to what constitutes foster care. The interim regulations describe such care as:
[Twenty-four]-hour care for children in substitution for, and away from, their
parents or guardian. Such placement ... involves agreement between the State
and foster family that the foster family will take care of the child. Although
foster care may be with relatives of the child, State action is involved in the
removal of the child from parental custody.
Id. § 825.112(e); see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg.
31,794, 31,798 (1993) ("Foster care is defined to require State action, rather than just an
informal arrangement to take care of another person's child."). Imagine a child, father un-
known, who is abandoned by her mother. The child's grandmother takes the child into
her home and begins to raise her. Such behavior by the grandmother, absent some state-
sanctioned approval, would not constitute "placement for adoption or foster care." There-
fore, the grandmother would not be entitled to FMLA leave for foster care during this
potentially difficult transition period. After the child becomes an adult and the grandmoth-
er falls ill, the child would be entitled to FMLA leave to care for her "parent." 29
C.F.R. § 825.113(b) (1993). Similarly, if the child became ill, her grandparent would be
entitled to leave to care for her "daughter." Id. § 825.113(c).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(13) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a) (1993).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(1) (1993).
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care is imposed when leave is sought to care for a spouse or par-
ent. Who, then, will be the caretakers of those over eighteen? Did
Congress assume they would be cared for by a spouse? That would
be inconsistent with its recognition of the increasing number of
single-parent households." Will it be the children of those over
eighteen? But surely many of those children will be infants or too
young to provide assistance.
Many young people eighteen and over, particularly those fur-
thering their education, are still effectively within their parents'
care. A twenty-year-old child is entitled to leave to care for a
seriously ill forty-two-year-old parent. Why shouldn't the forty-two-
year-old parent be entitled to leave to care for the seriously ill
twenty-year-old child? Did Congress assume that familial ties
somehow change at eighteen? The fact that "the parent-child rela-
tionship is as permanent when adult children are ill as when adult
parents are ill"'82 can hardly be disputed.
Leave because of the birth of a child must be "to care for
such son or daughter"83 but leave because of placement for adop-
tion or foster care does not have that restriction.' 4 Although it
might seem that the parent of a newborn whose spouse is provid-
ing the childcare is therefore not entitled to parental leave while a
similarly situated employee who has adopted a child is so entitled,
it is doubtful that such a disparity in treatment will result. First,
such a distinction is blatantly unfair, and unsupported by any legiti-
mate rationale. Neither the House nor Senate Reports that accompa-
nied the FMLA make reference to different requirements for leave
sought by "adoptive" and "natural" parents. Second, as discussed
later, the concept of leave "in order to care for" a family member
is very broad and does not necessarily mean that the employee
seeking leave must be the exclusive care provider. 6 In other
words, a parent should be able to satisfy the requirement that the
81. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
82. Donna R. Lenhoff & Sylvia M. Becker, Family and Medical Leave Legislation in
the States: Toward a Comprehensive Approach, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 433 (1989).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
84. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
85. The interim regulations merely parrot the statute, stating that an employer is re-
quired to grant leave "[f]or birth of a son or daughter, and to care for the newborn
child," but devote no attention to explication of "and to care for the newborn child." 29
C.F.R. § 825.112(a)(1) (1993).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58 (discussing in the context of certification
by a health care provider what is meant by "needed to care" for a family member).
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leave be "to care for such son or daughter" even if the other par-
ent is the primary child-care provider. Whether the leave is occa-
sioned by birth or placement, it must be used within twelve
months of the birth or placement. 7
B. Reduced/Intermittent Leave
Leave taken because of a child's birth or placement may not
be taken intermittently or on a reduced leave basis88 unless the
employer and employee agree. 9 Leave to care for an immediate
family member or oneself may be taken intermittently or on a
reduced leave schedule when medically necessary, even though the
employer may not agree to such arrangement.' "If the employee
requests intermittent leave ... the employer may require [the]
employee to transfer temporarily to an alternative position . . . that
has equivalent pay and benefits; and better accommodates [the
leave]. '""g A reduced or intermittent leave schedule does not result
in a reduction in the total amount of leave to which the employee
is entitled beyond the amount of leave actually taken.92
The Act does not specifically address whether an employer
may insist on reduced or intermittent leave when the employee
would prefer continuous leave. The hypothetical posed at the be-
ginning of this article serves as an example of this situation. The
Pennsylvania law professor, who has sufficient financial resources
to cover her most pressing bills during a twelve-week stay with her
cancer-stricken mother in California, may prefer to remain in Cali-
87. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
88. "'Intermittent leave' is leave taken in separate blocks of time due to a single ill-
ness or injury, rather than for one continuous period of time, and may include leave of
periods from an hour or more to several weeks." 29 C.F.R. § 825.203(b) (1993). "A
'reduced leave schedule' is a leave schedule that reduces an employee's usual number of
working hours per workweek, or hours per workday. In other words, a reduced leave
schedule is a change in the employee's schedule for a period of time, normally from full-
time to part-time." Id. § 825.203(C). The "employer may limit leave increments to the
shortest period of time (one hour or less) that the employer's payroll system uses to
account for absences or use of leave." Id. § 825.203(d).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
90. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.203(a) (1993) (stating that an employee may take
leave for one's own illness or a family member when no employer agreement is speci-
fied).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.204(a) (1993) (stating that an employee may be required to transfer to an alternate
position that better accomodates the leave). The alternative position need not have equiva-
lent duties. Id. § 825.204(c).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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fornia for a single twelve-week period even though her mother will
not require her assistance every day. However, it is expensive and
emotionally and physically draining to travel back and forth. The
law school, her employer, would prefer not to completely lose the
services of a faculty member right in the middle of an academic
semester. May the law school insist that she take intermittent leave
(in essence requiring that she fly back and forth between Pennsyl-
vania and California every other week), accommodating her need
to care for her mother after each chemotherapy session but also
accommodating the law school's need for her to teach her class-
es?93
The Act provides that when leave is sought because of illness
and the necessity for leave is foreseeable, the "employee shall
make a reasonable effort to schedule the treatment so as not to
disrupt unduly the operations of the employer."'  While the
daughter lacks the capacity to schedule her mother's treatment for
her employer's convenience, this language suggests that an employ-
ee may be required to adjust personal preferences regarding contin-
uous or intermittent leave to an employer's legitimate interests.
Employees who use intermittent leave pose an interesting ques-
tion about how to calculate the amount of leave used. Imagine an
employee, hourly or salaried, who regularly works fifty hours a
week. Her spouse has been seriously ill and requires her assistance
with three weekly physical therapy visits, with each visit requiring
a total of four hours absence from work (a weekly absence of
twelve hours). For what period must the employer permit such a
FMLA entitled absence from work? The statute specifies a maxi-
mum of twelve weeks of FMLA leave annually but leave can be
taken in segments of as brief as one hour.95 A workweek of forty
hours translates to 480 hours of leave. The hypothetical employee
93. Section 2618 of the Act has special provisions regarding intermittent and reduced
leave as well as leave occurring near the end of a term for individuals employed in an
instructional capacity by an elementary or secondary school. Depending on the foreseeable
duration of the leave or its proximity to the conclusion of a term, the school may restrict
the flexibility of leave otherwise available. See 29 U.S.C. § 2618(c)-(d) (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (discussing intermittent or reduced leave for an employee in an instructional capaci-
ty and rules applicable to leave periods falling at the conclusion of a term). The hypo-
thetical law school, however, does not fit § 2618's requirements because it is not an
elementary or secondary school.
94. Id. § 2612(e)(2)(A). In addition, the language, "[e]mployees . . . must attempt to
schedule their leave so as not to disrupt the employer's operations," is found in the inter-
im regulations dealing with intermittent and reduced leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.117 (1993).
95. 29 C.F.R. § 825.203(d) (1993).
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working fifty hours per week for twelve weeks accumulates 600
hours. The interim regulations ask: "How does one determine the
amount of leave used where an employee takes leave intermittently
or on a reduced leave schedule?"96 While they do not precisely
respond to the inquiry regarding the employee who regularly works
fifty hours a week, the responses by the interim regulations are of
some assistance. They provide:
(a) If an employee takes leave on an intermittent or
reduced leave schedule, only the amount of leave actually
taken may be counted toward the 12 weeks of leave to
which an employee is entitled. For example, if an employ-
ee who normally works five days a week takes off one
day, the employee would use 1/5 of a week of FMLA
leave. Similarly, if a full-time employee who normally
works 8-hour days works 4-hour days under a reduced
leave schedule, the employee would use 1/2 week of
FMLA leave each week.
(b) Where an employee normally works a part-time
schedule or variable hours, the amount of leave to which
an employee is entitled is determined on a pro rata or
proportional basis by comparing the new schedule with the
employee's normal schedule. For example, if an employee
who normally works 30 hours per week works only 20
hours a week under a reduced leave schedule, the
employee's ten hours of leave would constitute one-third of
a week of FMLA leave for each week the employee works
the reduced leave schedule.
(c) If an employer has made a permanent or long-term
change in the employee's schedule (for reasons other than
FMLA), the hours worked under the new schedule are to
be used for making this calculation.
(d) If an employee's schedule varies from week to
week, a weekly average of the hours worked over the 12
weeks prior to the beginning of the leave period would be
used for calculating the employee's normal workweek.97
From the language of the interim regulations, it appears that
the key to calculating the expenditure of intermittent or reduced
96. Id. § 825.205.
97. Id. § 825.205(a)-(d).
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leave is to determine the employee's normal workweek. Subsec-
tions a, b and d of section 825.205 use expressions such as "nor-
mally works," 98 and "normal workweek." 99 Moreover, section
825.205(b) provides that "the amount of leave to which an employ-
ee is entitled is determined on a pro rata or proportional basis by
comparing the new schedule with the employee's normal sched-
ule."'"' ° Arguably then, an employee working fifty hours a week
who uses twelve hours of FMLA leave will have exhausted only
12/50, or twenty-four percent, of a week of such leave.
A few words of caution about the above analysis are, however,
in order. The employee who regularly works fifty hours a week
does not meet the literal language of section 825.205(b) (an em-
ployee who "normally works a part-time schedule or variable
hours") 1° or of section 825.205(d) (an employee whose "schedule
varies from week to week.")0 2 The hypothetical employee is nei-
ther part-time nor one whose hours of work vary. From an em-
ployer record-keeping perspective, it may simply be easier to main-
tain a record of the number of hours the employee uses intermit-
tent leave and to conclude that her FMLA leave has been expend-
ed when she reaches 600 hours. Similarly, if the employee normal-
ly works thirty hours a week and takes intermittent leave, her
annual twelve weeks of FMLA leave is gone after 360 hours.
C. Compensability of Leave
The employer need not pay the employee who is on FMLA
leave. 3 The Act does provide that an employer may require the
employee, or the employee may elect, to substitute accrued vaca-
tion leave or personal leave for any FMLA purpose.'04 In addi-
tion, "accrued paid family leave may be substituted for birth or
adoption, or to care for a seriously-ill immediate family member;
and, accrued paid medical or sick leave may be substituted to care
for a seriously-ill immediate family member or for the employee's
own serious health condition."' 5
98. Id. § 825.205(a)-(b).
99. Id. § 825.205(d).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(b) (1993).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 825.205(d).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
104. Id. § 2612(d)(2)(A)-(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(d) (1993) (stating that paid
vacation or personal leave may be substituted).
105. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,802 (1993).
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The Act imposes a limitation on - the use of such substituted
leave. It specifies that an employer is not required "to provide paid
sick leave or paid medical leave in any situation in which [the]
employer would not normally provide any such paid leave.""t
The Department of Labor has taken the following position concern-
ing that language: If an employer's paid sick leave plan does not
permit use of that leave to care for an ill family member, but
limits its use to the employee's own ill health, the FMLA will not
require that leave associated with the family member's care be
paid." Correspondingly, the Department asserts a similar limita-
tion is imposed on family leave."8 It noted that the legislative
history provides:
The term "family leave" refers to "paid leave provided by
the employer covering the particular circumstance for which
the employee is seeking leave" for birth, adoption, or to
care for a seriously ill family member. In other words, if
the employer's family leave plan provides leave only for
birth, it cannot be used for another purpose; or if the plan
provides leave to care for a child, but not for a spouse, it
cannot be used to care for a spouse.'09
The Department of Labor observed that there is much disagree-
ment about the meaning of the expression "except that nothing in
[the Act] shall require an employer to provide paid sick leave or
paid medical leave in any situation in which such employer would
not normally provide any such paid leave.""'
Several of the sponsors of the legislation and the Women's
Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) contend in their comments
106. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(c)(1) (1993).
108. Id. § 825.207(b).
109. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,802 (1993).
Although the summary and discussion of The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
does not provide a citation for its reliance on legislative history, the Senate Report does
contain the quoted language. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 27, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 29. In Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 859 P.2d
1143 (Or. 1993), the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted Oregon's family leave statute to
provide that accrued sick time can be used even when the employee is not sick. The
Oregon statute read, "The employee seeking parental leave shall be entitled to utilize any
accrued vacation leave, sick leave or other compensation leave, paid or unpaid, during the
parental leave." OR. REv. STAT. § 659.360(3) (1992).
110. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,802 (1993)
(quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1993)) (alterations in original).
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that the limitation was intended to apply only to use of
paid sick leave for types of illnesses (i.e., medical condi-
tions) that would otherwise be covered by the employer's
plan (for example, if substance abuse treatment were ex-
cluded, paid leave could not be used for that purpose), but
not to limit an employee's ability to use paid sick leave to
care for an ill family member if the employer's plan does
not permit such use of paid sick leave. However, the histo-
ry of this provision lacks an explanation that it is so in-
tended and cannot, therefore, overcome the clearer reading
of the statutory language."'
While the Department of Labor's decision may be mandated by
the language,"' it will result in real hardship. As contrasted with
many industrialized nations, the FMLA's failure to require compen-
sated leave is conspicuous." It may divide people by class,
"helping those who can afford the three months without pay, by-
passing those who can't."'"4 Even the fortunate employee who is
permitted to use paid leave liberally will not be placed on a par
with the well-heeled; employees with the most generous benefit
packages will not typically have twelve weeks of accrued, paid
leave available every year. For those poorly paid employees who
have no (or limited use of) paid vacation, sick leave or family
leave, the FMLA may simply be irrelevant because
"[e]mployees ... can't afford to take unpaid leave."'"5
While the concept of unpaid family leave is supported by con-
cern for minimizing costs to employers and ensuring that such
leave is not abused,"6 the need to care for the newborn and the
111. Id.
112. For a thoughtful critique of the Department of Labor's position, see Martin H.
Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1047, 1086-89 (1994). The Federal
Employees Family Friendly Leave Act, P.L. 103-388, permits certain federal employees to
utilize "sick leave to care for a family member with an illness, injury or other condition
that would justify the use of sick leave for the employee." President Gets Bill On Feder-
al Family Leave, Daily Lab Rep. (BNA) Item 23, (Oct. 17, 1994).
113. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
114. Lisa Genasci, Family Leave Law: Taking Care of Caregivers, THE CHARLOTrE OB-
SERVER, Aug. 1, 1993, at 7B (quoting Marie Wilson, president of the Ms. Foundation).
115. Family Leave: Most Firms Will Spread Absentees' Work Around, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 24, 1993, at Al (alterations in original).
116. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 43, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 45
(stating that one purpose of the Act is "to accomodate the legitimate interests of employ-
ers"). The interim regulations also provide: "An employee who fraudulently obtains FMLA
leave ... is not protected by FMLA's job restoration or maintenance of health benefits
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seriously ill, which Congress also identified,"7 must be met by
someone. The FMLA is a reflection of society's agreement that
those needs are best met by family members. Employees who
cannot afford to take unpaid leave will still expend enormous ener-
gy worrying about their ill children and family members, resulting
in a loss of productivity."8 Those productivity costs might more
than offset the savings realized by employers from their employees'
limited ability to use sick and family leave.
D. Insurance
The on-leave employee, whether or not the leave is paid, is
entitled to continued coverage under the employer's health insur-
ance plan."9 During any period of FMLA authorized leave, the
employer must maintain coverage under any "'group health
plan' . . . for the duration of such leave at the level and under the
conditions coverage would have been provided if the employee
continued in employment continuously for the duration of such
leave."' ° To the extent the employee is normally required to pay
all or a portion of health care premiums, the requirement continues
during the leave.'
provisions." S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 43, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 45.
29 C.F.R. § 825.312(g) (1993).
117. See id. (stating that another purpose of Act is to "entitle employees to take reason-
able leave, for family or medical reasons").
118. See id. at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9 (".[C]aregiving not only causes
stress for individuals, it may be a substantial drag on national productivity.").
119. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "An employer is not required to
provide health benefits unless the employer already does so." The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,803 (1993).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In addition:
Some commentators asked whether government entities are subject to
the requirement to maintain health benefits of eligible employees during periods
of FMLA leave, because government entities are excluded from the IRS defini-
tion of "employer" under the Internal Revenue Code for purposes of imposing
an excise tax on employers or employee organizations which contribute to
"nonconforming" group health plans. The Internal Revenue Code subsection
which excludes federal and other government entities from the definition of
"group health plan" for this purpose . . . is a separate provision from that
incorporated into FMLA . . . . FMLA includes public agencies within its defi-
nition of covered employers. There is no indication in either the Act or its
legislative history supporting a view that public agencies are not required to
maintain employee's health benefits during periods of FMLA leave, and they
must do so.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794 31,803 (1993).
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that conditions of
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Once again, employees using reduced or intermittent leave
present an interesting question about continuation of health care
benefits. Assume an employee who normally works forty hours a
week. Because of her own serious health condition she is required
to reduce her hours of weekly employment to twenty. Under the
terms of her employer's health care benefits plan, for which the
employer pays 100% of the premium, part-time employees (defined
as those who work twenty or fewer hours weekly) are excluded
from coverage. To what health care coverage, if any, is the re-
duced leave employee entitled?
As noted earlier, if an employee uses intermittent or reduced
leave, the employer may require the employee to transfer tempo-
rarily to an alternative position." The alternative position must,
however, have "equivalent pay and benefits."'" The interim regu-
lations provide:
The employer may also transfer the employee to a part-
time job with the same hourly rate of pay and bene-
fits .... For example, an employee desiring to take leave
in increments of 4 hours per day could be transferred to a
half-time job paying the *same hourly rate as the
employee's previous job and enjoying the same benefits.
The employer may not eliminate benefits which otherwise
would not be provided to part-time employees; however, an
employer may proportionately reduce earned benefits, such
as vacation leave, where such a reduction is normally made
by an employer for its part-time employees. "
This regulation indicates that to deny the employee health care
coverage because of her temporary, part-time status would be un-
lawful. Could the employer, instead, insist that the employee pay a
certain portion of each premium? From the employer's perspective,
such an approach would not constitute an elimination of a benefit
coverage remain the same for an employee on leave); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.210(a)
(1993) (stating that any share of premiums paid by the employee continues to be paid by
the employee during the leave). "[A]n employer's obligations to maintain health insurance
coverage ceases if an employee's premium payment is more than 30 days late. All other
obligations of an employer under FMLA would continue; for example, the employer con-
tinues to have an obligation to reinstate an employee upon return from leave." Id.
§ 825.212(a).
122. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
124. 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(c) (1993) (emphasis added).
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but rather a proportionate reduction in one. From the employee's
perspective a benefit, free health care, has been eliminated.
Although normally the employer would not be required to
maintain an employee's life or disability insurance coverage during
the FMLA leave, the Department of Labor has cautioned that poli-
cies which require a waiting period, submission to a physical or
limitations regarding a new pre-existing condition may cause diffi-
culties for employers." In order to ensure that the employee is
entitled to such coverage immediately upon her return, the employ-
er realistically may have to pay such premiums on the employee's
behalf during the leave.' 26
E. Notice
When the need for leave is foreseeable, the employee is re-
quired to provide the employer with notice at least thirty days
before the date the leave is to begin. 127 If the date of the birth,
the placement or the need for medical treatment requires leave to
begin in less than thirty days, such notice "as is practicable" is re-
quired. 1'28 When the necessity for leave is associated with the care
125. U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Op., 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) § 5409 (New
Developments, Nov. 2, 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 825.213(f) (1993) (stating that the employer
may elect to maintain these benefits to ensure that it can meet its duties to provide an
equivalent benefit for an employee who returns from leave); see also id. § 825.212(c)
(stating that an employee does not have to satisfy coverage requirements, such as a wait-
ing period, if the policy lapses because the employer must provide equivalent benefits to
the returning employee).
126. The interim regulations provide that an employer that pays an employee's share of
life insurance, disability or even health care premiums is entitled to recover from the
employee the amount of premiums paid. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.212(b), 825.213(0 (1993). The
Department of Labor has advised that "it is intended the employer and employee make
arrangements for repayment that do not unduly impact the employee's financial condition
such as periodic payroll deductions." DOL Advisory Op., supra note 125. At least one
group, the Service Employees International Union, has claimed that the Department of
Labor has "no legal authority under the FMLA or any other law to create any remedy
for recovering premiums." FMLA Proponants Urge Liberal Interpretation, 1 Analysis/News
and Background Info. 142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 449, 465, 467 (Apr. 19, 1993). Title III
of the FMLA established a Commission on Leave which is directed specifically to study
"the ability of the employers to recover, under section 2614(c)(2) of this title, the premi-
ums described in such section." 29 U.S.C. § 2632(1)(G) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). An employee who uses paid
leave is only "required to comply with the requirements of the employer's leave plan, and
not any more stringent requirements of FMLA (e.g., notice or certification requirements)
unless the paid leave period is followed by a period of unpaid FMLA leave." 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.207(g) (1993).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "'As soon as practicable'
means as soon as both possible and practical, taking into account all of the facts and
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of a family member or the employee's own ill-health and the ne-
cessity for such leave is foreseeable based on planned medical
treatment, a "reasonable effort" must be made to schedule the
treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the operations of the employ-
er.'29 The Act does not specify what happens when the employee
fails to provide notice as directed. The interim regulations address
the issue by providing the following: "If an employee fails to give
30 days notice for foreseeable leave with no reasonable excuse for
the delay, the employer may deny the taking of FMLA leave until
at least 30 days after the date the employee provides notice to the
employer of the need for FMLA leave."' 30
If an employer provides an employee handbook which deals
with employee benefits, "the handbook must incorporate informa-
tion on FMLA rights and responsibilities and the employer's poli-
cies regarding the FMLA.'' If there is no handbook or manual,
"the employer shall provide written guidance to an employee con-
cerning all the employee's rights and obligations under the FMLA
whenever an employee requests leave under the FMLA."''
When an employee provides notice of the need for FMLA
leave, the employer must provide the employee with notice detail-
ing the specific expectations and obligations of the employee and
explaining any consequences of a failure to meet these obliga-
tions.'33 This notice should include, as appropriate:
(1) That the leave will be counted against their annual
FMLA leave entitlement;
(2) Any requirements for the employee to furnish medi-
cal certification of a serious health condition and the conse-
circumstances in the individual case." 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(b) (1993).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra text accompanying
notes 93-94 (discussing whether an employer can force an employee to take reduced or
intermittent leave rather than continuous leave since the continuous leave may disrupt the
employer's operations).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 825.304(b) (1993). In order to delay a leave because of insufficient
notice,
it must be clear that the employee had actual notice of the FMLA notice re-
quirements. This condition would be satisfied by the employer's proper posting
of the required notice at the worksite where the employee is employed. Further-
more, the need for leave and the approximate date leave would be taken must
- have been clearly foreseeable to the employee 30 days in advance of the leave.
Id. § 825.304(c).
131. Id. § 825.301(a).
132. Id. § 825.301(b).
133. Id. § 825.301(c).
4831995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
quences of failing to do so;
(3) The employee's right to substitute paid leave and
whether the employer will require the substitution of paid
leave, and the conditions related to any substitution;
(4) Any requirement for the employee to make any
premium payments to maintain health benefits and the
arrangements for making such payments;
(5) Any requirement for the employee to present a
fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment;
(6) Their status as a "key employee" and the potential
consequence that restoration may be denied following
FMLA leave, explaining the conditions required for such
denial;
(7) The employee's right to restoration to the same or
an equivalent job upon return from leave; and,
(8) The employee's potential liability for payment of
health insurance premiums paid by the employer during the
employee's unpaid FMLA leave if the employee fails to
return to work after taking FMLA leave."
In addition, employers are expected "to responsively answer ques-
tions from employees concerning their rights and responsibilities
under the FMLA."'35
F. Serious Health Condition
Leaves other than those associated with child placement and
childbirth are permitted for two reasons: 1) if the family member
of the employee has a "serious health condition" and the employee
is needed to care for the family member;3 6 and 2) if the employ-
ee has a "serious health condition" that renders the employee un-
able to perform her job.'37 The Act defines "serious health condi-
tion" as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental con-
dition that involves-(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or
residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a
health care provider."'38 The "inpatient care" aspect of the defini-
134. Id. § 825.301(c)(1)-(8) (citations omitted).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d) (1993).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
138. Id. § 2611(11). The Senate Report supports a conclusion that the following are
serious health conditions:
[H]eart attacks, heart conditions requiring heart bypass or valve operations, most
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tion of serious health condition should not be difficult to deter-
mine. The interim regulations specify that "in-patient care" means
an overnight stay. i"9 If the employee or family member spends
the night in a medical facility, she has a serious health condition.
The interim regulations recognize that "voluntary or cosmetic
treatments" which are not medically necessary can still qualify as
"serious health conditions.""'' The regulations require, however,
that such treatments be accompanied by "inpatient hospital
care.' ' 14' The more open-ended aspect of the "serious health con-
dition" definition is the part of the statute that addresses "illness,
injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that in-
volves ... continuing treatment by a health care provider.0
42
The interim regulations explain that this language includes:
(2) Any period of incapacity requiring absence from
work, school, or other regular daily activities, of more than
three calendar days, that also involves continuing treatment
by (or under the supervision of) a health care provider; or
(3) Continuing treatment by (or under the supervision
of) a health care provider for a chronic or long-term health
condition that is incurable or so serious that, if not treated,
would likely result in a period of incapacity of more than
three calendar days; or for prenatal care.14
3
In essence, the employee or family member must: (i) be ill at least
three days and receiving treatment from a health care provider; ii)
need continuing treatment for a chronic or long-term health condi-
tion that is incurable or that, if untreated, would likely result in a
period of incapacity of more than three days; or, iii) need pre-natal
care.144
It is obvious that not every disorder will qualify as a "serious
cancers, back conditions requiring extensive therapy or surgical procedures,
strokes, severe respiratory conditions, spinal injuries, appendicitis, pneumonia,
emphysema, severe arthritis, severe nervous disorders, injuries caused by serious
accidents on or off the job, ongoing pregnancy, miscarriages, complications or
illnesses related to pregnancy, such as severe morning sickness, the need for
prenatal care, childbirth and recovery from childbirth.
S. REp. No. 3, supra note 18, at 29, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 31.
139. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(1) (1993).
140. Id. § 825.114(c).
141. Id.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)-(3) (1993).
144. Id.
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health condition." Although a cold or sore throat may satisfy the
requirement of incapacitation for at least three calendar days, many
such illnesses will not require "continuing" treatment by a health
care provider. 45 The concept of "continuing treatment" requires
145. If illnesses such as colds, sore throats, and the flu are accompanied by continuing
treatment by a health care provider, they will be considered "serious." However, it has
been suggested that such illnesses are not sufficiently debilitating to be deemed "serious
health conditions." Employers Express Concerns with Definition of Serious Health Condi-
tions in FMLA Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Item 25, (Dec. 15, 1993) (asserting that
members of the Equal Employment Advisory Council were forced to provide leave for
conditions such as whiplash, migraine headaches, back problems, chicken pox, a root
canal, and poison ivy and contending that Congress specifically rejected covering these
types of illnesses). Nevertheless, the legislative history on this point certainly can be read
to support a conclusion that these illnesses are "serious." The Senate Report specifically
lists maladies such as heart attacks, cancer, strokes, appendicitis, pneumonia, emphysema,
and injuries from serious accidents as those which are obviously "serious." S. REP. No. 3,
supra note 18, at 29, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 31. The report also provides,
however, that the term "serious health condition" is "intended to cover conditions or ill-
nesses that affect an employee's health to the extent he or she must be absent from work
on a recurring basis or for more than a few days for treatment or recovery." Id. at 28
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 30 (emphasis added).
The Senate Report does contribute to some unnecessary confusion regarding how
"serious" the health condition must be. The discussion above regarding absence from work
"for more than a few days" appears in the Senate Report's second paragraph under the
heading "Meaning of Serious Health Condition." See id. The third paragraph under that
heading provides as follows:
The term 'serious health condition' is not intended to cover short-term condi-
tions for which treatment and recovery are very brief. It is expected that such
conditions will fall within even the most modest sick leave policies. Conditions
or medical procedures that would not normally be covered by the legislation
include minor illnesses which last only a few days and surgical procedures
which typically do not involve hospitalization and require only a brief recovery
period.
Id. The third paragraph then states that "in any case where there is doubt whether cover-
age is provided by this act, the general tests set forth in this paragraph shall be determi-
native." Id. (emphasis added).
What are the "general tests"? The language "set forth in this paragraph" suggests
that the "general tests" are found in the third paragraph. As noted above, the third para-
graph states that "short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief'
are not covered by the FMLA. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 28, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 30. But the more general approach to what constitutes a "serious health
condition" is that found in the second paragraph, i.e., that an employee's health must be
affected "to the extent that he or she must be absent from work on a recurring basis or
for more than a few days." Id.
To add to the mystery, the fourth paragraph of the Senate Report under the heading
"Meaning of Serious Health Condition" begins by providing examples of conditions which
are obviously serious. See id. at 29, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 31. It concludes
the list of examples by stating the following:
All of these conditions meet the general test that either the underlying health
condition or the treatment for it requires that the employee be absent from
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being treated two or more times by a health care provider" or
being treated
two or more times by a provider of health care services
(e.g., physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by,
a health care provider, or is treated . . . by a health care
provider on at least one occasion which results in a regi-
men of continuing treatment under the supervision of the
health care provider - for example, a course of medication
or therapy - to resolve the health condition.'47
Also included within continuing treatment is an individual who is
"under the continuing supervision of, but not necessarily being
actively treated by, a health care provider due to a serious long-
term or chronic condition or disability which cannot be cured."'48
Because the interim regulations contemplate that a single
night's hospital stay will constitute a "serious health condition",
there may be situations in which a shorter absence from work will
be deemed subject to the FMLA's protections while a longer ab-
sence will not. For example, the FMLA would not protect an em-
ployee who stayed home five days to care for her child with the
chicken pox (who was not receiving treatment from a health care
provider). Her co-worker who missed a single day of work because
of an overnight hospital stay in conjunction with a suspected con-
cussion would be protected by the FMLA.
The Act grants great discretion to the Secretary of Labor with
regard to the question of "health care provider." The statute defines
"health care provider" as "a doctor of medicine or osteopathy who
is authorized to practice medicine or surgery" or "any other person
determined by the Secretary to be capable of providing health care
service."' 49 The Secretary has sanctioned a list of providers limit-
ed to Christian Science practitioners, podiatrists, dentists, clinical
work on a recurring basis or for more than a few days for treatment or recov-
ery. They also involve either inpatient care or continuing treatment or supervi-
sion by a health care provider, and frequently involve both.
Id. (emphasis added). It appears Congress meant the "general test" for a "serious health
condition" to be that just described. Unfortunately, it used the expression "general tests"
in a paragraph which contains language arguably inconsistent with the standard it wished
to adopt.
146. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b)(1) (1993).
147. Id. § 825.114(b)(2).
148. Id. § 825.114(b)(3).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(6)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, nurse practitioners, and
nurse midwives.1 50
An employer may require that a request for leave associated
with ill health be "supported by a certification issued by the health
care provider." '151 A copy of such certification shall be provided
to the employer in a timely manner.'52 The certification must
state
(1) the date on which the serious health condition com-
menced;
(2) the probable duration of the condition;
(3) the appropriate medical facts within the knowledge
of the health care provider regarding the condition;
(4)(A) . . . a statement that the eligible employee is
needed to care for the [family member] and an estimate of
the amount of time such employee is needed to care for
the [family member]; and
(B) . . a statement that the employee is unable to
perform the functions of the position of the employee. 53
The interim regulations specify what it means for a health care
provider to certify that an employee is "needed to care for" a
family member.54 That provision "encompasses both physical and
150. 29 C.F.R. § 825.118(b)(l)-(3) (1993). The interim regulations apparently contem-
plate that individuals such as occupational, respiratory and physical therapists, social -work-
ers, and speech pathologists are not "health care providers." See Advocacy Group Calls
for Expedited Process to Handle Employee Charges Filed Under FMLA, Daily Lab. Rep.,
(BNA) Item 25, (Dec. 17, 1993). To the extent that an employee or her immediate family
member is required to utilize the services of such individuals, the time spent in such
endeavors entitles the employee to FMLA leave only when the services provided are
"under orders of, or on referral by a health care provider." Id.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). After a medical condition has been
certified, recertification may be requested by the employer at a "reasonable interval." 29
C.F.R. § 825.308 (1993).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The employee must provide the re-
quested certification ... within the time frame requested by the employer (which must
allow at least 15 calendar days after the employer's request), unless it is not practica-
ble . . . to do so .... " 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (1993). A failure to provide timely
certification may result in a denial of leave until the certification is provided. Id.
§ 825.311(a). The Department of Labor invited comment "regarding the appropriate timing
of the certification when there is a need for an employee to care for an immediate family
member with a chronic, degenerative serious health condition, and where the family mem-
ber may not be under the continuing treatment of a health care provider." The Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,807 (1993).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(l)-(4)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
154. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.116(a) (1993).
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psychological care."'55 It includes the following situations: "[Tihe
family member is unable to care for his or her own basic medical,
hygienic, or nutritional needs or safety, or is unable to transport
himself or herself to the doctor."'5 6 The concept also includes the
provision of "psychological comfort and reassurance which would
be beneficial to a seriously ill child or parent receiving in-patient
care.' s5  The "needed to care" requirement is also satisifed
"where the employee may be needed to fill in for others who are
caring for the family member, or to make arrangements for chang-
es in care, such as transfer to a nursing home."'58
When an "employer has reason to doubt the validity of the
certification provided," the employer may require, at the employer's
expense, a second opinion from a different health care provider
designated by the employer. 9 If there is a conflict between the
health care providers, the employer may require, again at the
employer's expense, the opinion of a third provider designated or
approved jointly by the employer and the employee."W The third
provider's opinion shall be "final and binding". 6' The Act does
not specify how employers and employees are to resolve disputes
about the identity of the third health care provider and the Depart-
ment of Labor has solicited input on the issue.
G. Reinstatement/Failure to Return
When the employee has exhausted the twelve weeks of leave,
the employee must be reinstated to his or her prior position or an
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 825.116(b).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Neither the Act nor the regula-
tions address whether the doubt must be in good faith. Where the health care provider is
a Christian Science practitioner, "an employee may not object to any requirement from an
employer that the employee or family member submit to examination (though not treat-
ment) to obtain a second or third certification from a health care provider other than a
Christian Science practitioner." 29 C.F.R. § 825.118(a)(3) (1993).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
161. Id. § 2613(d)(2).
162. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,807 (1993)
(explaining what an employer can do if it questions the adequacy of a medical certifica-
tion and indicating that the Department of Labor has requested comments on selecting a
third health care provider). The interim regulations do require that "[tihe employer and the
employee must each act in good faith to reach agreement on whom to select for the third
opinion provider." 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(c) (1993). My personal preference is that the
dispute be resolved by a coin toss. It is quick, easy, impartial, and maximizes the pres-
sure on the parties to resolve the dispute before they ever have to toss the coin.
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equivalent position. 63 A relatively recent state court decision,
Kelley Co., v. Marquardt,"6 interpreted a state family and medi-
cal leave statute and may be useful in determining the parameters
of the concept of "equivalent position." In Kelley, an employee re-
turned from leave authorized by the Wisconsin Family and Medical
Leave Act.165 That statute specifies that when an employee re-
turns she is entitled to her former or "equivalent employment posi-
tion."' "Equivalent employment position" means "equivalent
compensation, benefits, working shift, hours of employment and
other terms and conditions of employment." 67 In Kelley, Ms.
Marquardt was placed in a position which had the "same pay,
same benefits, and the same office as her prior position."'68 How-
ever, under her new position, she had fewer employees to super-
vise, had neither a job description nor a job title, and a consider-
able portion of the work was clerical. 69 The court focused on the
statutory requirement of equivalent "terms and conditions of em-
ployment" (language identical to that of the federal FMLA) 70 and
concluded that because Marquardt's "authority and responsibility
were greatly reduced in the new position," the positions were not
equivalent. 7 '
The interim regulations specify that the requirement of restora-
tion to the same or equivalent position means "the same or geo-
graphically proximate worksite."' The regulations also provide,
however, that restoration to equivalent employment "does not ex-
tend to intangible, unmeasurable aspects of the job."'73 As exam-
ples of such intangible aspects, the interim regulations suggest that
the perceived loss of potential for future promotional op-
portunities is not encompassed in equivalent ... working
conditions; nor would any increased possibility of being
subject to a future layoff. However, restoration to a job
163. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
164. 493 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. 1992).
165. Id. at 71 (construing Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act, WiSc. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.10 (West Supp. 1993)).
166. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 103.10(8)(a)2 (West Supp. 1993).
167. Id.
168. Kelley, 493 N.W.2d at 72.
169. Id.
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
171. Kelley, 493 N.W.2d at 74.
172. 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(e)(1) (1993).
173. Id. § 825.215(f).
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slated for layoff when the employee's original position is
not would not meet the requirements of an equivalent posi-
tion.'74
The employer must treat the returning FMLA employee as
though there had been no lapse of service.'75 An employee may,
but is not entitled to, accrue seniority or other employment bene-
fits, such as vacation, personal leave or sick leave, during the
leave.'76 With respect to retirement plans and pensions, the inter-
im regulations require that "any period of FMLA leave will be
treated as continued service (i.e., no break in service)."'7
The Act specifically permits an employer to require an employ-
ee returning to work from leave based on her own serious health
condition to provide "certification from the health care provider of
the employee that the employee is able to resume work."'78 If an
employer has notified the employee of the necessity of such certifi-
cation, "[a]n employer may deny restoration to employment until
an employee submits a required fitness-for-duty certification."'79
If an employee fails to return from an authorized leave, the
employer is permitted to recover from the employee any premium
the employer paid for maintaining health insurance coverage.'
The interim regulations provide that "[a]n employee who returns to
work for at least 30 calendar days is considered to have 'returned'
to work.''. If the employee fails to return to work because of
the continuation, recurrence, or onset of the employee's serious
health condition or that of an immediate family member or other
circumstances beyond the control of the employee, the employer
174. Id.; see also Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 790 F. Supp. 1516, 1522-
23 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that restoration of an employee returning from pregnancy
leave to a "much less secure" position constitutes discrimination under the Washington sex
discrimination statute).
175. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2)-(3)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing that a re-
turning employee cannot lose benefits accrued prior to taking leave and is entitled to any
right, benefit or position of employment that the employee would have had if leave had
not been taken).
176. Id. § 2614(a)(3)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(d)(2) (1993) (providing that an
employee is not entitled to accrue additional benefits or seniority during FMLA leave).
177. Id. § 825.215(d)(4).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
179. 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(d) (1993).
180. Id. § 825.213(a). "When an employee elects or an employer requires paid leave to
be substituted for FMLA leave, the employer may not recover its (share of) health insur-
ance premiums for any period of FMLA leave covered by paid leave." Id. § 825.213.
181. Id. § 825.213(b).
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may not recover the premiums. 2 While the Act does not specify
what constitutes "other circumstances beyond the control of the
employee," the House Report and regulations indicate that a "high-
ly compensated employee" denied restoration will not have to
repay premiums."3 The regulations provide other examples of cir-
cumstances which will "excuse" a failure to return to work such as
transfer of a spouse, care of a family member, or lay-off during
the leave."
IV. HOW THE FMLA IS ENFORCED
Employers are forbidden from interfering with, restraining or
denying the exercise or attempt to exercise any right provided by
the Act.' It is also unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by
the Act. 6 Enforcement of the Act is quite similar to enforcement
of the federal Fair Labor Standard Act,8 7 but there are some dif-
ferences.
Like the Fair Labor Standards Act, an aggrieved employee may
bring an action in state or federal court seeking lost compensation
and interest as well as liquidated damages in an equal amount.8
If the employee has not lost compensation, she may still recover
"any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct
result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to a
sum equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary for the employee."'8 9
As contrasted with the Fair Labor Standards Act, the FMLA pro-
vides that the individual employee may obtain "such equitable
relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement,
and promotion."'90 In addition, the FMLA permits the Secretary
of Labor to seek enforcement of the Act and recover damages on
182. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
183. See H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 3, at 42; 29 C.F.R. § 825.213(a)(2).
184. 29 C.F.R. § 825.213(a)(2) (1993).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
186. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. II 1990 & Supp. III 1991
& Supp. IV 1992).
188. See id. § 216(b); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Act con-
templates the recovery of a "reasonable attorney's fee" after a "judgment awarded to the
plaintiff." 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)(3) (1988). It may not be sufficient that the plaintiff was
merely a prevailing party. See Stumper v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 24, 27 F.3d
316 (7th Cir. 1994).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
190. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
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the employee's behalf or obtain an injunction. 91 The Act specifi-
cally contemplates a class action.'"
Employers are required to post a notice informing employees
and applicants of the pertinent provisions of the legislation and
information pertaining to filing of a charge. 93 An employer who
fails to post such notice may be assessed a penalty not to exceed$100.194
V. FMLA's RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER RELEVANT LEGISLATION
A. State and Local Leave Laws
The FMLA is clear that the federal legislation is to serve as a
minimum protection for employees. It specifically provides that if
state legislation authorizes greater benefits and protections, employ-
ers in that state are required to abide by the state statutory provi-
sions as well as the FMLA.'95 For example, if a state required
191. See id. § 2617(b) (providing for the enforcement of the FMLA and the recovery
of damages); id. § 2617(d) (providing for injunctive relief).
192. See id. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (stating that an action to recover damages or equitable
relief may be maintained "by any one or more employees for and in behalf of ... the
employees and other employees similarly situated").
The interim final rules have been criticized for their failure to "establish an expedit-
ed complaint procedure to handle charges that employers have unfairly denied employee
requests for leave." Advocacy Group, supra note 150. The Women's Legal Defense Fund
has asserted that an "expedited complaint procedure is essential because of the need for
immediate resolution of employee charges that they were denied the leave guaranteed by
the FMLA." Id. The Fund opined that an expedited procedure is "necessary to vindicate
the rights of the employee." Id. The Fund also has pointed out that the interim rules
make no reference to injunctions although the statute clearly provides that "such equitable
relief as may be appropriate" is available. Id.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As noted earlier, whether the em-
ployer has posted notice can be critical in determining whether an employee who failed to
provide appropriate notice of the necessity for leave may have her leave delayed. See
supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing the notice requirements of the
FMLA and noting that an employer may delay FMLA leave if these notice requirements
are not met).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The notice provision applies to an
"employer" which includes employers of 50 or more employees who have no eligible
employees either because the employees have not worked the requisite number of hours or
months, or the employees are employed at worksites where fewer than 50 employees
work, or employers which are public agencies and which employ fewer than 50 employ-
ees. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43 (defining the word employer for purposes
of the FMLA).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). It may not be easy to determine
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employers to provide twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a
seriously ill parent-in-law, (a parent-in-law's ill health would not
justify FMLA leave)'96 an employee would be entitled to such
state-mandated leave. In addition, if, within the same year, the em-
ployee became seriously ill herself, she would be entitled to an
additional twelve weeks of FMLA leave.9 7 Although the FMLA
requires thirty days (or reasonable) notice of the need for leave, an
employer must allow a shorter notice period under state law "un-
less an employer has already provided, or the employee is request-
ing, more leave than required under State law."' 198 "If State law
provides for only one medical certification, no additional certifica-
tions may be required ... unless the employer has already provid-
ed, or the employee is requesting, more leave than required under
State law."'99
The interim regulations take the position that "[i]f leave quali-
fies for FMLA leave and leave under State law, the leave used
counts against the employee's entitlement under both laws."'
Essentially, the leaves run concurrently."' While one could argue
that an employee should be able, during a twelve-month period, to
invoke separately either state or federal family leave, the legislative
history is to the contrary. The Senate Report provides:
Section 401(b) [Section 2651(b)] makes it clear that
state and local laws providing greater leave rights than
those provided in S. 5 are not preempted by the bill or any
other federal law. This applies to state and local laws in
effect at the time of enactment or state and local laws
enacted in the future. Thus, for example, state or local laws
whether a more generous state statute applies to an employment relationship. If an eligible
employee resides in one state, works in another state, and the employer has its headquar-
ters in a third state, what is the applicable state law for purposes of the FMLA? The
state in which the employee's workplace is located. Labor Department Fielding Family
Leave Questions, 1 Analysis/News and Background Info., 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 441
(Aug. 2, 1993). The workplace is not necessarily identical to the concept of "worksite"
used for "determining employee eligibility for FMLA leave." See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.111(a)(2) (1993).
196. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining the word parent for
purposes of entitlement to leave under FMLA).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a)(5) (1993).
198. Id. § 825.701(a)(3).
199. Id. § 825.701(a)(4).
200. Id. § 825.701(a).
201. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,809
(1993) ("State and FMLA-mandated leave entitlements run concurrently ....").
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that provide greater employee coverage, longer leave peri-
ods, or paid leave, are not preempted by this act to the
extent that they provide leave in a manner more inclusive
or more generous than that provided in S. 5.202
The assertion that, to the extent that state and local leave laws
are more generous they are not preempted leads, through obversion,
to the conclusion that state and local laws which are no more
generous than the FMLA are preempted. Accordingly, the interim
regulation's conclusion that if leave qualifies under both the FMLA
and state law it is "count[ed] against the employee's entitlement
under both laws"2 3 is correct. The interim regulations contain the
following example of the principle of recognizing the more gener-
ous state provision while at the same time recognizing that the
leaves will run concurrently:
If state law provides 16 weeks of leave entitlement
over two years, an employee would be entitled to take 16
weeks one year under State law and 12 weeks the next
year under FMLA. Health benefits maintenance under
FMLA would be applicable only to the first 12 weeks of
leave entitlement each year. If the employee took 12 weeks
the first year, the employee would be entitled to a maxi-
mum of 12 weeks the second year under FMLA (not 16
weeks). An employee would not be entitled to 28 weeks in
one year.2
B. Anti-Discrimination Legislation
Men and women are equally entitled to FMLA benefits. A man
who wishes leave to care for a newborn or newly-placed child
must be given the same opportunity as a woman for such leave, or
any other kind of FMLA benefit. It has been asserted, however,
that of the likely 2.5 million people taking FMLA leave annually,
most will be women.0 5 Indeed, the Senate Report particularly fo-
202. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 38, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 40.
203. 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a) (1993).
204. Id. § 825.701(a)(1).
205. 353 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 6 (June 18, 1993). Two commentators have asserted that
"if all workers were entitled to medical leave, employers would find women and men
taking medical leave approximately equally." Lenhoff & Becker, supra note 82, at 419.
"Statistics on the incidence of loss of work due to medical reasons, including pregnancy-
related medical reasons, show that men and women are out on medical leave approximate-
ly equally.... Id. (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTIcs, DISABILITY
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cused on the emergence of women into the labor force." 6 The
congressional findings, specifically enumerated in the statute, assert
that "due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our
society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls
on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of
women more than it affects the working lives of men. 207
Therefore, employers who wish to avoid or minimize FMLA
obligations may very well prefer men to women when making
hiring and promotion decisions. Such obvious sex discrimination
would violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964208 and
any applicable state anti-discrimination legislation.2 9
Even absent intentional discrimination, an employer's compli-
ance with the FMLA may not absolve it of all discrimination lia-
bility. For example, in United States Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission v. Warshawsky & Co., 2 ° an employer had a dis-
ability policy that denied paid sick leave to any employee during
DAYS, UNITED STATES, 1980 (Series 10, No. 143, DHH8 Pub. No. (PHS) 83-1571)
(1983)). In addition, making family leave equally available to men and women "would
not affect female and male employees very differently." Id. It is recognized that while it
is
true that more mothers than fathers of newborns are likely to take time off
from work beyond the post-childbirth period of disability, a greater percentage
of working men than working women have newborns in any year. In 1985,
3.7% of working women gave birth, while 4.6% of working men had wives
who gave birth. And although more women than men will be affected when
other family members have serious health conditions, the number of men affect-
ed is not insubstantial. Indeed, when the number of hours that women and men
lost from their jobs for all illnesses - their own and others'- is totalled, the
average number of hours lost by women is, surprisingly, less than that for men.
Id. at 419-20 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (discussing the increase of women into
the workforce since 1900).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
208. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. II 1990 &
Supp. III 1991).
209. Without an express admission from the employer that the woman was disfavored
because of her sex, the problem for a potential plaintiff would be how to prove such
discrimination. For the Supreme Court's most recent discussion of a plaintiffs burden in a
Title VII lawsuit, see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Advocacy
groups such as "9 to 5 National Association of Working Women, Milwaukee, and the
NOW Legal Defense Fund, New York-saw a sharp increase in telephone complaints
alleging pregnancy-related firings in the weeks around the [FMLA's] Aug. 5 effective
date." Sue Shellenbarger, Do Some Firms Try to Skirt Family Leave?, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 1993, at Bl.
210. 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. II1. 1991).
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the first year of employment.2 ' This policy was deemed to con-
stitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because its application had a disparate impact
on women." 2 Fifty-three employees had been discharged pursuant
to the policy."3 Fifty of the fifty-three were women and twenty
of the fifty women were pregnant.
24
If the prediction by some is true that a greater proportion of
women than men will take FMLA leave,2 5 then it may be rea-
sonable to conclude that women will be over represented in the
number of people for whom twelve weeks leave is inadequate. As
evidenced by Warshawsky, an employer's failure to recognize this
fact and unwillingness to accommodate those whose absence ex-
ceeds twelve weeks may lead to a prima facie showing of a Title
VII violation.2 6 The employer's practice of merely complying
with the FMLA requirement of twelve weeks leave may very well
be unlawful unless "job related ... and consistent with business
necessity. '217 Discriminatory outcomes are not the result of com-
pliance with the FMLA but rather the failure of employer leave
programs to fully accommodate employees. Employers who grant
FMLA leave in a non-discriminatory fashion may be led into a
false sense of security regarding their potential legal exposure.2"'
C. Fair Labor Standards Act
211. Id. at 650.
212. Id. at 655.
213. Id. at 650.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 203 (asserting that the majority of FMLA leave taken annually will
be by women).
216. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Warshawsky, 768
F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Even though women may be overrepresented in terms
of people for whom 12 weeks leave is inadequate, their overrepresentation may not be
statistically (or legally) significant. But cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436
(1971) (holding employer practices which had a "markedly disproportionate" impact on
blacks to be in violation of Title VII).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). As the court in
Warshawsky noted, "[m]ere recitation of a policy's necessity is not sufficient to carry
defendant's burden." Warshawsky, 768 F. Supp. at 655. The defendant in Warshaivsky
asserted its policy was a "'reward' for employees who continued with the company for
more than one year." Id. The defendant failed to produce evidence, however, that the
policy actually served to reduce turnover. Id.
218. A similar potential for race discrimination claims exists. The Senate Report noted
that "African American caregivers are especially at risk because greater percentages of
black caregivers quit their jobs in order to provide care." S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18,
at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9.
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Under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act219 (FLSA) an ad-
ministrator, executive, or professional employed on a salary basis
is excluded from entitlement to overtime pay.22° All other em-
ployees protected by the FLSA must be paid one and one-half
times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty
during a workweek.2 ' In interpreting the FLSA the Department
of Labor has taken the position that if an employer docks an other-
wise salaried employee's pay for absences of less than one day, the
employee is no longer salaried.2 The rationale supporting the
Department of Labor's position is the notion that "[the] salaried
employee is compensated not for the amount of time spent on the
job, but rather for the general value of services performed."2
Thus, when an employer docks a salaried employee's pay, the
employer effectively admits that the employee is compensated for
the amount of time spent on the job. Because she is no longer
salaried, she loses her exempt status and is therefore entitled to
premium pay for hours worked in excess of forty.
As described earlier, the FMLA expressly permits leaves of
less than one day, including leaves of as short as an hour, and
permits an employer to count that absence against the employee's
annual twelve-week total.24 The FMLA specifies that such ac-
counting shall not affect an employee's exemption from overtime
pay.225 The FMLA and FLSA are in obvious tension on this issue
since the FMLA tolerates hourly pay docking while the Department
of Labor (which is charged with enforcing both statutes) asserts
that such pay docking is forbidden under the FLSA.226
219. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. II 1990 & Supp. III 1991
& Supp. IV 1992).
220. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f),
541.2(e), 541.3(e) (1993) (stating the salary requirement for executives, administrators, and
professionals for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act) (emphasis added).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988).
222. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(2) (1993) (detailing permissible pay deductions for
absences of a salaried employee); see also Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486
(9th Cir. 1990) ("'[D]eductions from the salary of an otherwise exempt employee for
absences of less than a day's duration for personal reasons, or for sickness or disability,
would not be in accordance with sections 541.118(a)(2) and (3)."') (quoting Wage &
Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Ltr. Rul. (Jan. 15, 1986)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068
(1991).
223. Abshire, 908 F.2d at 486.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92 (detailing how to calculate intermittent
leave for purposes of the FMLA).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
226. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,802
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The disparate approach under the two statutes will lead to
inequities. An employer with fewer than fifty employees, not sub-
ject to the FMLA, may not dock the pay of an employee who
misses two hours of work to have stitches removed after surgery
without running afoul of the FLSA. The employer with fifty em-
ployees may dock the pay of a similarly situated employee. A
salaried employee who visited the dentist during work time for a
routine check-up could not have her pay docked without jeopardiz-
ing her exempt status while the same employee could have her pay
docked for a one hour, post-operative visit to her surgeon.
Congressional approval of pay docking for intermittent FMLA
leaves completely undercuts the rationale for the Department of
Labor's FLSA position."27 While the literal terms of the FMLA
allow the Department of Labor to have it both ways, this tension
should be resolved. Congress must repeal either section 2612(c) of
the FMLA or require the Department to rescind 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.118 and withdraw its Letter Ruling."
D. Americans With Disabilities Act
The Americans With Disabilities Ace29 (ADA) makes it un-
lawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual with a
disability. It further requires employers to reasonably accommodate
a disabled individual." Since the FMLA specifies that an em-
ployee is entitled to leave for her own "serious health condi-
tion","' there will be some interplay between the two statutes,
particularly when the employee seeks to return to work or seeks a
leave longer than the twelve weeks mandated by the FMLA.
It is the clear intent of the FMLA to treat the leave-taking
employee as if she had not taken leave. 3' Therefore, if the em-
ployee becomes incapacitated but does not seek leave, the employer
(1993) ("[The Department [of Labor] is concerned about the tension between the effects
of partial-day 'docking' under FLSA and FMLA's encouragement of more generous em-
ployment policies and adherence with more generous State laws.").
227. See supra text accompanying note 221 (stating that the Department of Labor does
not tolerate pay docking because salaried employees are paid for the general value of
services performed, not the amount of time spent on the job).
228. See Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Letter
Ruling), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991).
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1990 & Supp. III 1991).
230. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
231. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77 (describing how employers must treat
returning employees under the FMLA).
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would be required only to place the employee in a position which
she could handle with reasonable accommodation, not to maintain
her in her former position. Although the FMLA specifies that a
seriously ill employee who takes leave is entitled to her former or
an equivalent position,233 the employer may deny reinstatement to
that position if the employee's condition is such that she is no
longer able to perform the essential functions of her job.
Similarly, the disabled employee may be entitled to more than
twelve weeks leave. If the employee can be reasonably accommo-
dated by granting more than twelve weeks leave, the ADA requires
the employer to do so. An employer's obligation to "reasonably
accommodate" an employee's disability may mean that an employ-
er will offer an employee an alternative work assignment or "light
duty" for the duration of the disability. When the cause of the
disability is a work-related accident or disease, such an assignment
is a vehicle for controlling workers' compensation costs.
In an advisory opinion, the Department of Labor has taken the
position that an employer may not require the employee to accept
the new assignment in lieu of FMLA leave.' This interpretation
is surely correct. If an employee has a "serious health condition"
she is entitled to FMLA leave; no qualifications or limitations are
included in the statute. Congress obviously considered the possibili-
ty that an employee with a "serious health condition" may be
capable of some work. An easy example is an individual undergo-
ing treatment for cancer. The individual falls within Congress'
contemplation of a person with a "serious health condition," '235 yet
on many days may still be able to work.
The statutory provision which describes an employer's ability
to require medical certification of the employee's condition clearly
supports the Department of Labor's advisory opinion. It specifies
that the employer may require a health care provider to state that
the "employee is unable to perform the functions of the position of
the employee." 6 The language does not suggest a requirement
that the employee be unable to perform the functions of any posi-
233. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
234. See DOL Says FMLA Should Give Workers Choice, 1 Analysis/News and Back-
ground Info., 144 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 400 (Nov. 29, 1993) (discussing the available
alternatives for temporarily disabled workers under the FMLA).
235. See supra text accompanying note 138 (stating the meaning of "serious health
condition" as defined by Congress).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(4)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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tion which the employer may offer.
Given the fact that FMLA leave need not be compensated,
many employees who are capable of "light duty" will voluntarily
choose to return to work. When the cause of the "serious health
condition" is work-related, however, state-mandated workers' com-
pensation benefits (frequently amounting to two-thirds of pay) may
encourage the employee to take advantage of what might amount
to compensated FMLA leaveY7
An affliction clearly deemed a disability under the ADA will
not necessarily constitute a "serious health condition" for purposes
of the FMLA. Section 12102(2) of the ADA expansively defines
"disability" to include an individual with "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.""2  Although
a significant hearing loss, for example, may substantially limit a
major life activity by limiting employment opportunities, it will not
constitute a "serious health condition" unless it necessitates in-
patient care or continuing treatment by a health care provider.
When an employee's own serious health condition necessitates
leave, the employer must be careful to segregate any information
related to the health condition from the employee's personnel file
and closely monitor access to the information. The ADA specifi-
cally requires that such information should be "collected and main-
tained on separate forms and in separate medical files and [be]
treated as a confidential medical record." 9
E. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)24 is federal legislation which applies to a broad range
237. Whether the employee is entitled to continue to receive a workers' compensation
benefit would be determined under the state workers' compensation statute. Although the
Department of Labor has advised that an employee may insist on the FMLA leave rather
than accept the light duty assignment, "[tihis does not mean that the employee would be
entitled to continue to receive benefits under the workers' compensation program if the
program is structured in such a way as to end benefits at the point at which the employ-
ee is deemed medically able to accept a light duty assignment and one is offered by the
employer." U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Op., unpublished (Apr. 19, 1994) (on file with
Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1988).
239. Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(e) (1993) (stating what records
must be kept to comply with the FMLA and how these records must be maintained).
240. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. 11 1990 & Supp. III 1991
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of employer-provided benefits. Compliance with ERISA holds
important consequences for the federal income tax liability of em-
ployers and employees. The Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)"4' amended ERISA to provide
that upon the occurrence of a "qualifying event," including termi-
nation of employment, the employee must be provided with the
opportunity to continue as part of the employer's group health
insurance plan with the premiums paid by the former employ-
ee. 2 The former employee may continue such health insurance
coverage for at least eighteen months after termination of employ-
ment.243 When an employee takes FMLA leave and decides not to
return to work (or is a key employee and is denied restoration) the
employment relationship is clearly terminated. When does the peri-
od for calculating COBRA benefit eligibility begin? Is it the date
leave begins, the date the employee is scheduled to return and fails
to do so, the date the employee advises the employer she will not
return to work or some other date?
The interim regulations assert that "[i]f an employee gives
unequivocal notice of intent not to return to work, the employer's
obligations under FMLA to maintain health benefits (subject to
COBRA requirements) and to restore the employee cease."2" It is
only in this context that the FMLA regulations make reference to
the COBRA question.
The minority report of the House Committee on Labor and
Education considered the COBRA issue and opined:
[I]t is the apparent intention of the proponents of H.R. 1
that the 18- to 36-month month continuation of health care
coverage requirements under Title X of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) would not
begin until after it is clear that the employee would not be
returning to work, rather than to allow computation of the
continued coverage period from the time leave began.245
& Supp. IV 1992).
241. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. II 1990 & Supp. III
1991 & Supp. IV 1992).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
243. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A)(i) (1988).
244. 29 C.F.R. § 825.309(b) (1993); see also id § 825.209(0 ("[A]n employer's obliga-
tion to maintain health benefits under FMLA ceases if and when an employee informs the
employer of his or her intent not to return from leave .....
245. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 3, at 71-72.
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A Republican amendment which would have started the clock
running from the date leave began was defeated.246
The Senate Report asserted
[1]eave taken under this act does not constitute a qualifying
event .. . under . .. COBRA. However, a qualifying
event triggering COBRA coverage may occur when it be-
comes known that an employee is not returning to employ-
ment and therefore ceases to be entitled to leave under this
act. The purpose of this Act is to provide leave to eligible
employees ... and is not to be construed by employees
as a means of delaying a qualifying event.247
Despite these views expressed in the legislative history, unfortu-
nately the FMLA itself is silent on the issue.
In the FMLA context, a COBRA "qualifying event" may occur
when there is "any ... [termination or reduction in hours] which,
but for the continuation coverage required under this part, would
result in the loss of coverage of a qualified beneficiary."248 An
employee enjoying FMLA leave has obviously experienced a "re-
duction of hours" and it might be concluded that the beginning of
FMLA leave is such a "qualifying event." Because the FMLA re-
quires an employer to continue health insurance coverage during
the leave,249 the employee's reduction in hours will not coincide
with a "loss of coverage" under the employer's plan.
In Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, which did not
involve the FMLA, the U.S. District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts, took the position that the COBRA qualifying event is
the point at which the employee "experienced a loss of coverage as
a consequence of that reduction in hours.""0 Using the approach
of the district court in Gaskell, since the employee on FMLA leave
does not experience a loss of health insurance coverage until she
asserts that she will not return to work or does not in fact return,
the COBRA "qualifying event" would not occur until then. The
First Circuit vacated the district court's opinion in Gaskell, howev-
er, asserting that "an employee's eighteen month period of con-
246. Id. at 76.
247. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 18, at 32, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 34.
248. 29 U.S.C. § 1163 (1988).
249. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (explaining an employer's obligation
to continue health insurance coverage for an employee on leave under the FMLA).
250. 762 F. Supp. 1539, 1543 (D. Mass. 1991), vacated, remanded 3 F.3d 495 (1st Cir.
1993).
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tinuation coverage ...commence[s] with the event leading, under
the terms of the plan, to loss of coverage, rather than upon the
loss of coverage itself. '251
The First Circuit, after recognizing that COBRA's language did
not clearly resolve the issue, relied on the statute's legislative his-
tory and the proposed regulations of the Treasury Department for
its conclusion that the qualifying event may occur before coverage
is actually lost. 252 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the terms
of the employer's health insurance plan are critical to an analysis
of the qualifying event. It stated that a "reduction in hours is not a
'qualifying event' if it is not so designated in the plan, even if it
might have been designated as such, and regardless of the fact that
it may ultimately have led to the eventual occurrence of a 'qualify-
ing event' which was so designated.' '""s
Applying the First Circut's Gaskell analysis to an FMLA sce-
nario leads to the conclusion that COBRA's eighteen-month contin-
uation coverage period is triggered by the onset of FMLA leave if
the employer's health insurance plan designates such a reduction in
hours as a "qualifying event". Under such a plan an employee who
decides she will not return to work at the end of her twelve weeks
of FMLA leave and notifies the employer of this decision at the
end of the twelve weeks is entitled to eighteen months less twelve
weeks of COBRA coverage. If the employer's plan does not desig-
nate a reduction in hours as a "qualifying event" (and presumably
does designate termination as a "qualifying event"), then the
FMLA-leave employee who chooses not to return will have CO-
BRA coverage for a full eighteen months after she notifies the
employer of her intention.254
VI. CONCLUSION
The Family and Medical Leave Act alters the way employers
are required to look at their workforces. It mandates consideration
of employees as members of families, not merely widget makers,
251. Gaskell v. Harvard Coop. Soc'y, 3 F.3d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis add-
ed).
252. Id.
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. The IRS has recently asserted that "the taking of leave under FMLA does not
constitute a qualifying event for COBRA purposes under Section 4980B of the Internal
Revenue Code." IRS Issues Guidance on Coordination of COBRA Coverage with FMLA
Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Item 14, (Dec. 7, 1994).
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secretaries or law professors. 5 That is a healthy change in the
way the American labor force is perceived. Surely a workplace
where compassion for the trials and tribulations which befall all of
us will improve morale and understanding.
Nevertheless, the FMLA has shortcomings. For many poorly
compensated employees, its promises will be hollow. Women may
find their employment opportunities limited. Productivity and effi-
ciency may occasionally be less than an employer desires. Employ-
ers will have greater administrative and recordkeeping burdens.
These costs and difficulties, however, are not significant enough to
outweigh the lasting benefits associated with more humane
workplaces. Not only will workplaces ultimately be better places to
work, but fewer community resources will have to be expended on
those needs which are truly familial responsibilities. Congress has
taken an important and appropriate step toward an enhanced quality
of work life.
255. "[T]he law caused . . . companies to enhance existing policies and increased
awareness about the need for 'family-type' programs." FMLA Has Had Limited Impact On
Most Employers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Item 10, (Aug. 22, 1994).
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